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Abstract
This paper studies mergers in two-sided markets by estimating a structural supply and
demand model and performing counterfactual experiments. The analysis is performed on
data for a merger wave in U.S. radio that occurred between 1996 and 2006. The paper makes
two main contributions. First, I identify the conicting incentives of merged rms to exercise
market power on both sides of the market (listeners and advertisers in the case of radio).
Second, I disaggregate the eects of mergers on consumers into changes in product variety and
changes in supplied ad quantity. I nd that rms have moderate market power over listeners
in all markets, extensive market power over advertisers in small markets and no market power
over advertisers in large markets. Counterfactuals reveal that extra product variety created
by post-merger repositioning increased listeners' welfare by 1.3% and decreased advertisers'
welfare by about $160m per-year. However, subsequent changes in supplied ad quantity
decreased listener welfare by 0.4% (for a total impact of +0.9%) and advertiser welfare by an
additional $140m (for a total impact of -$300m).
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1Between 1996 and 2006, the U.S. radio industry experienced an unprecedented merger wave.
This merger wave was prompted by the 1996 Telecommucation Act, which raised ownership caps in
local markets and abolished cross-market ownership restrictions. At the height of merger activity,
about 30% of stations changed ownership each year and about 20% changed programming format.
In this paper, I use this merger wave to study the consequences of consolidation in two-sided
markets. I make two main contributions. First, I identify conicting incentives for stations to
exercise market power on both sides of the market (in the case of radio, the two sides are advertisers
and listeners). In particular, I separate the impact of consolidation on listener and advertiser
surplus. Second, I decompose this impact into two parts: changes in product variety, and market
power. In particular, I evaluate whether extra variety can mitigate the negative eects of a decrease
in competition. Similar issues arise in other two-sided markets such as credit cards, newspapers
or computer hardware. The framework proposed in this paper can be easily adjusted to analyze
any of these industries.
In two-sided markets, rms face two interrelated demand curves from two distinct types of
consumers. These demands give merging rms conicting incentives because exercising market
power in one market lowers prots in the other market. In the case of radio, a company provides
free programming to listeners but draws revenue from selling advertising that is priced on a per-
listener basis. In the listener market, a merged rm would like to increase post-merger advertising
because it captures some switching listeners. This advertising decreases the welfare of listeners and
increases the welfare of advertisers. However, from the perspective of the advertising market, the
merged rm would like to supply less advertising, which has the exact opposite impact on listener
and advertiser welfare. The rm's ultimate decision, which determines the impact of consolidation
on the welfare of both consumer groups, depends on the relative demand elasticities in the two
markets.
In this paper, I separately estimate elasticities for both groups using a structural model of the
demand and supply of radio programming and advertising. Using those estimates, I perform coun-
terfactual policy experiments that quantify the impact of consolidation on listener and advertiser
surplus. I nd that market power on the listener side is similar across geographical markets. In
contrast, the amount of market power on the advertiser side depends on market population. In
particular, rms have a considerable control over advertising price in smaller markets; however,
2they are price takers in larger markets. Consequently, mergers result in rms lowering advertising
quantity in small markets (less than 500 thousand people) by about 13%, which leads to a 6%
per-listener increase in ad prices. Mergers increase listener surplus by 2.5% but at the same time
decrease advertiser surplus by $235m per year. Conversely, in large markets (more than 2 million
people) mergers lead to a 5.5% increase in total advertising minutes while per-listener price stays
constant. This results in a 0.3% decrease in listener welfare as well as a slight decrease in adver-
tiser welfare ($0.1m per year). The aggregate national impact of the merger wave amounted to a
listener welfare gain of 1% and a $300m per year advertiser welfare loss. I conclude that listeners
beneted and advertisers were disadvantaged by the 1996 Telecom Act.
My work is related to several theoretical papers studying complexity of pricing strategies in
two-sided markets. The closest studies related to this paper are: Armstrong (2006), Rochet and
Tirole (2006), Evans (2002) and Dukes (2004). The general conclusion in this literature is that
using a standard supply and demand framework of single-sided markets might be not sucient
to capture the economics of two-sided markets. Additionally, there have been several empirical
studies on this topic. For example Kaiser and Wright (2006), Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007)
and Chandra and Collard-Wexler (2009) develop empirical models that recognize the possibility
of market power in both sides of the market. They use a form of the Hotelling model proposed
by Armstrong (2006) to deal with product heterogeneity. I build on their work, incorporating
recent advances in the literature on demand with dierentiated products. This allows me to
incorporate richer consumer heterogeneity and substitution patterns (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995), and Nevo (2000)) that are necessary to capture complicated consumer preferences
for radio programing. Moreover, I supplement reduced form results on market power with out-
of-sample counterfactuals that explicitly predict changes in supplied ad quantity and consumer
welfare.
The second contribution of this paper is the decomposition of the total impact of mergers on
consumer surplus into changes in product variety and eects of exercising extra market power
from joint ownership. This exercise is motivated by the fact that in most cases consumers have
preference for variety, so it is possible that extra variety created by mergers might mitigate the
negative eects of extra market power. In order to verify the above claim, I quantify consumers'
value for extra variety and compare it to the loss in surplus coming from the extra market power.
3This approach relates to Kim, Allenby, and Rossi (2002), who compute the compensating variation
for the changes of variety in tastes of yogurt and Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith (2003) who do the
same for the variety of books oered in on-line bookstores. These papers assume away the fact that
changes in variety will be followed by readjustments in equilibrium prices. In this paper, taking
their analysis one step forward, I incorporate such strategic responses by performing counterfactual
experiments in which new equilibrium prices are computed.
Berry and Waldfogel (2001) and Sweeting (2008) document that the post-1996 merger wave
resulted in an increase in product variety. I investigate their results using a structural utility
model and nd that extra variety leads to a 1.3% increase in listener welfare. However, because
product repositioning softened competition in the advertising market and caused some stations to
switch to a \Dark\ format 1, advertiser welfare also decreased by $147m per year. Additionally, I
nd that product ownership consolidation and repositioning are followed by advertising quantity
readjustments. I estimate, that this eect leads to a 0.3% decrease in listener welfare and an
additional $153m decrease in advertiser welfare. The two eects combined total to $1% increase
in listener welfare and $300m decrease in advertise welfare. While extra variety mitigates the
negative eects of mergers on listeners, it strengthens the negative impact on advertisers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the questions investigated in the paper in
a formal way and describes the structural model of the industry. Section 3 contains the description
of the data. Estimation techniques used to identify the parameters of the model are described in
Section 4. Results of the structural estimation are presented in Section 5. Section 6 describes the
results of counterfactual experiments. Robustness checks of dierent modeling assumptions are
contained in Section 7. Section 8 provides the conclusion.
1 Radio as a two-sided market
The radio industry is an example of a two-sided market (other examples include advertising plat-
forms, credit cards or video games). Such markets are usually characterized by the existence of
three types of agents: two types of consumers and a platform provider. What distinguishes this
1When in \dark" format, the station holds the frequency so that other stations cannot use it. \Dark" stations
typically do not broadcast or broadcast very little non-commercial programming.
4setup from a standard dierentiated product oligopoly is that the platform provider is unable to set
prices for each type of consumer separately. Instead, the demand curves are interrelated through
a feedback loop in such a way that quantity sold to one consumer determines the market clearing
price for the other consumer. In this subsection I argue that this feedback makes it complicated
to determine whether the supplied quantities are strategic substitutes or complements (as dened
in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985)). This creates important trade-os in the case of a
merger and aects the division of surplus between both types of consumers. The remainder of this
subsection discusses this mechanism in detail using the example of radio; however, the discussion
applies to the majority of other two-sided markets.
In the case of radio there are three types of agents: radio stations, listeners, and advertisers.
Radio stations provide free programming for listeners and draw revenue from selling advertising
slots. First, consider the demand curve for radio programming. The listener market share of the
radio station j is given by
rj = rj(qjs;d;
L) (1.1)
where q is the vector of advertising quantities, s are observable and unobservable characteristics
of all active stations, d are market covariates and L are parameters of the listener demand. Since
radio programming is free, there is no explicit price in this equation. However, because listeners
have disutility for advertising, its eect is similar to price, i.e.
@rj
@qj < 0.
The market clearing price of an advertising slot in station j depends on the amount of adver-




where A are parameters. Note that the advertising quantity aects the advertising price in two
ways: directly through the rst argument and indirectly through the listener demand feedback
loop (the second argument).
Suppose for now that each owner owns a single station and there is no marginal cost (I relax
these assumptions later). In equilibrium, each radio station chooses their optimal ad quantity,




5In contrast to a dierentiated products oligopoly, the rm has just one control (ad quantity) that
determines the equilibrium point on both demand curves simultaneously. The rst order conditions








qj + pj = 0
The important fact is that this condition shares features with both the Cournot and Bertrand
models. On the one hand, the rst term represents the direct eect of quantity on price, and it
is reminiscent of the standard quantity setting equilibrium (Cournot). On the other hard, the
second component represents the listener feedback loop and is reminiscent of the price setting
model (Bertrand), because ad quantities function like prices in the demand for programming.
In order to determine the impact of a merger on the equilibrium ad quantities supplied we need
to know if they are strategic complements or substitutes. The duality described in the previous
paragraph make it ambiguous. This is because in the Cournot model quantities are strategic
substitutes and in the dierentiated product Bertrand model prices are strategic complements.
Without knowing the relative strengths of the direct eects and the feedback loop, we cannot
conclude whether a merger leads to an increase or decrease in ad quantity on the margin. Moreover,
in the borderline case in which the eects cancel each other, a merger does not eect quantity
at all; in this case, even though companies have market power over both consumers, they are
unable to exercise it. Measuring these eects is critical for predicting the split of surplus between
advertisers and listeners. When the direct eect is stronger, mergers lead to contraction in the
ad quantity supplied and higher prices. This will benet listeners but hurt advertisers. However,
if the feedback loop is stronger than the direct eect then merger leads to more advertising and
lower prices, beneting advertisers and hurting listeners.
Because the theory does not give a clear prediction about the split of surplus, I investigate
this question empirically using a structural model. In the remainder of this section I put more
structure on equations (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3), enabling separate identication of both sets of de-
mand elasticities. I discover the relative strength of the direct and feedback eects and perform
counterfactuals that quantify the extent of surplus reallocation.
61.1 Industry setup
During each period t, the industry consists of M geographical markets that are characterized by a
set of demographic covariates d 2 Dm. Each market m can have up to Jm active radio stations and
Km active owners. Each radio station is characterized by one of F possible programming formats.
Station formats include the so-called \dark" format when a station is not operational The set of
all station/format congurations is given by FJm. Ownership structure is dened as a Km-element
partition of station/format conguration smt 2 FJm. In an abuse of notation, I will consider smt
to be a station/format conguration for market m at time t, as well as an ownership partition.
Each member of the ownership partition (denoted as sk) species the portfolio of stations owned
by rm k.
The quality of the programming of radio station j is fully characterized by a one-dimensional
quality measure j 2   R. The state of the industry at time time t in market m is therefore fully
characterized by: a station/format conguration and ownership structure stm, vector of station
quality measures tm and market covariates dtm. In the next subsections I present a detailed
model of listener demand, advertiser demand, and supply side. Throughout the description I take
the triple (stm;tm;dtm) as given and frequently omit market or time subscripts to simplify the
notation.
1.2 Listeners
This subsection describes the details of the demand for listenership introduced in equation (1.1).
The model will be a variation on the random coecient discrete choice setup proposed by Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
I assume that each listener chooses only one radio station to listen to at a particular moment.
Suppose that s is a set of active stations in the current market at a particular time. For any radio
station j 2 s, I dene a vector j = (0;:::;1;:::;0) where 1 is placed in a position that indicates
the format of station j.







3FMj + j + ji (1.4)
where L
2i is the individual listener's demand sensitivity to adverting, qj the amount of advertising,
7j the unobserved station quality, ji an unobserved preference shock (distributed type-1 extreme
value), and nally L
1i is a vector of the individual listener's random eects representing preferences
for formats.











2 + 2i; 2i  N(0;2)
where 1 is a diagonal matrix, Fm(Dijd) is an empirical distribution of demographic characteristics,
i is unobserved taste shock, and  is the matrix representing the correlation between demographic
characteristics and format preferences. I assume that draws for i are uncorrelated across time
and markets.
The random eects model allows for fairly exible substitution patterns. For example, if a
particular rock station increases its level of advertising, the model allows for consumers to switch
proportionally to other rock stations depending on demographics.
Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), I can decompose the utility into a part that










ji = (j;qj;Di;i) = (Di + 1i)j + 2iqj
and error term ji.
Given this specication, and the fact that ji is distributed as an extreme value, one can derive
the expected station rating conditional on a vector of advertising levels q, market structure s, a






j02s exp[j0 + j0i]
dF(i)dFm(Dijd)
1.3 Advertisers
In this subsection I present the details of the demand for advertising introduced in equation (1.2).
The model captures several important features specic to the radio industry. In particular, the
8pricing is done on a per-listener basis, so that the price for a 60sec slot of advertising is a product of
cost-per-point (CPP) and station rating (market share in percents). Moreover, radio stations have
a direct market power over advertisers, so that CPP is a decreasing function of the ad quantities
oered by a station and its competitors. The simplest model that captures these features and is a















where f is a format of station j, A
1 is a scaling factor for value of advertising, A
2 is a market power
indicator and !ff0 2 
 are weights indicating competition closeness, between formats f and f0.
The weights ! are a key factor determining competition between formats and thus market
power. They reect the fact that some formats are further and others are closer substitutes for
advertisers because of dierences in the demographic composition of their listeners. In principle,
one could proceed by estimating these weights from the data. However, here it is not feasible to
do that because the available data do not contain radio station level advertising prices. Instead, I
make additional assumptions that will enable me to compute the weights using publicly available
data. The reminder of this subsection discusses the formula for the weights and provides an
example supporting this intuition. The formal micro-model is given in Appendix B.
Let there be A types of advertisers. Each type a 2 A targets a certain demographic group(s)
a. I.e. advertiser of type a gets positive utility only if a listener of type a hears an ad. Denote rfja
to be the probability that a listener of type a chooses format f and rajf to be the probability that
a random listener of format f is of type a. Advertisers take these numbers, along with station
ratings rj, as given and decide on which station to advertise. This assumption is is motivated by
the fact that about 75% is purchased by small local rms. Such rms' advertising decisions are
unlikely to inuence prices and station ratings in the short run.














The formal justication and derivation of this equation is given in Appendix B. The intuition
behind it is that the total impact on the per-listener price of an ad in format f is a weighted average
of impacts on the per-listener value of an ad for dierent types of advertisers. The weighting is
9done by the advertisers' arrival rates, which are equal to the listeners' arrival rates rajf. For each
advertiser of type a the change of value of an ad in format f, in response to a change of total
quantity supplied in format f0, is aected by two things: it is proportional to the probability of
correct targeting in format f, given by rajf, because advertisers are expected utility maximizers;
and it is proportional to the share of advertising purchased by this advertiser in format f0, given
by rf0ja. Assembling these pieces together and normalizing the weights to sum to 1 gives equation
(1.6).
To illustrate how these weights work in practice, consider the following example. Suppose that
there are only two possible formats of programming: Talk and Hits, and two types of consumers:
Teens and Adults. Teens like mostly Hits format and Adults like Talk format. However, Adults
like Hits more than Teens like Talk. Hypothetical numerical values of rfja and rajf are given in
Table 1.
In Table 1, the impact of Hits on the price of Talk is greater than the impact of Talk on
the price of Hits. This is due to the fact that the quantity supplied in the Hits format aects
Adult-targeting advertisers (who drive the price of the Talk format) to a much greater extent than
ad quantity in Talk aects Teen-targeting advertisers (who drive the price of the Hits format).
Moreover, because the weights sum up to 1, it must be that the own eect of Talk is weaker than
that of Hits. This is exactly the essence of the mechanism behind Equation (1.6). More examples
from the data with an extensive discussion are given in Section 4.
In the next section I will combine demand for programming and advertising to compose the
prots of the radio station owners.
1.4 Radio station owners
In this subsection I will describe a prot maximizing problem for the radio station owners. It will
be a version of equation (1.3) that allows for non-zero cost in selling advertising and common radio
station ownership. Given the advertising quantity choices of competing owners q k, the prot of
10radio station owner k is given by




























where Cj(qj) is the total cost of selling advertising. I assume constant marginal cost and allow for
a rm level of unobserved cost heterogeneity j, i.e. Cj(qjjA;C) = A
1 [C + j]qj.
















C   j = 0 8k and j 2 sk (1.8)
Additionally, I assume that station unobserved quality is exogenous but serially correlated. It









j is an exogenous innovation to station quality.
2 Data description
I have constructed a panel of data on radio stations and radio station ownership merging data
from two sources: BIA Financial Network Inc. and the SQAD Media Market Guide.
BIAfn provided me data on: radio station ownership, revenues, market shares and formats.
The data are a 1996-2006 panel covering each radio station in the market in 2006. The data are
incomplete in the sense that I do not observe all the stations that exited the market between 1996
and 2006. According to Sweeting (2007) there were only 50 stations that exited during this period,
mostly due to violations of FCC regulations. Because this number is small relative to the 11,000
stations in the sample, this omission is unlikely to signicantly inuence the results.
The BIAfn data are supplemented with data on aggregate advertising prices. Unfortunately,
price data at the station level are not available. SQAD instead provides estimates of market prices
that are obtained using proprietary formulas. According to anecdotal evidence, those estimates
11are widely recognized as the industry standard and are the best available data on market prices.
Radio market prices are reported as a Cost per Rating Point (CPP). CPP is the cost of advertising
per 1 percent of listenership. SQAD provides CPP broken down into daytime and demographic
categories. We will estimate station level prices from SQAD CPPs using radio station ratings that
are broken down by time of day and demographics.
An observation in my data is a radio station operating in a specic half-year and in a specic
market. BIAfn and SQAD use Arbitron market denitions. An Arbitron market is in most cases a
county or a metropolitan area. According to the surveys conducted by CRA International (2007)
for the Canadian market (which is similar to the US market): \The majority of radio advertisers
are local. They are only interested in advertising in their local area since most of their customers
and potential buyers live in or very near their city." In our analysis, I assume no interdependence
between markets. To further assure that there is no overlap between markets, I use only the 88
market sub-selection that was developed in Sweeting (2007). Table 7 presents a list of the 88
markets, along with their populations.
To achieve a sharper identication of the random eects covariance matrix, I use listenership
shares of dierent demographic groups in each of the formats that has been aggregated from the 100
biggest markets 2. I observe listenership shares of dierent age/gender groups within each station
format between 1998 and 2006, and shares for income, race and education groups between 2003
and 2006. Unfortunately, I do not observe a full matrix of market shares for all the combinations
of demographic variables. For example, I do not see what the share of rock stations is among
black, educated males. Instead I have shares for blacks, educated people, and males.
Table 2 contains some basic aggregate statistics about the industry. The top part of the table
documents changes in concentration of radio station ownership. The average number of stations
owned in our dataset grew from 4:43 in 1996 to 6:28 in 2006. This ownership consolidation
resulted in growth of the market share of the 3 biggest owners (C3) from 77% in 1996 to 90%
in 2006, peaking at 97% in 2000. The middle part of the table contains the average percentages
of stations that switched owners and that switched formats. Between 1996 and 2000 more than
10% of stations switched owners yearly. After 2000 the number dropped to below 4%. Greater
concentration activity in the 1996-2000 period was also associated with more format switching.
2Source: Arbitron Format Trends Report
12The percentage of stations that switched format peaked in 1998 and 2001 at 13%.
3 Estimation
The estimation of the model is done in two steps. In the rst step, I estimate the demand
model that includes parameters of the consumer utility L (see equation (1.4)) and the unobserved
station quality lag parameter  (see equation (1.9)). In the second step, we recover parameters
of the inverse demand for advertising A, wjj0 (see equation (1.5)) and cost parameters C (see
equation (1.7)).
3.1 First stage
This stage provides the estimates of demand for radio programming L. Estimation is done using
the generalized method of simulated moments. I use two sets of moment conditions. The rst set
is based on the fact that innovation to station unobserved quality j has a mean of zero conditional
on the instruments:
E[jt   jt 1jZ1;
L] = 0 (3.1)
This moment condition follows Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and extends it by explicitly
introducing auto-correlation of . I use instruments for advertising quantity since it is likely to
be correlated with unobserved station quality. My instruments include: lagged mean and second
central moment of competitors' advertising quantity, lagged market HHIs and lagged number and
cumulative market share of other stations in the same format. These are valid instruments under
the assumption that t follows an AR(1) process and the fact that decisions about portfolio selection
are made before decisions about advertising.
A second set of moment conditions is based on demographic listenership data. Let Rfc be the
national market share of format f among listeners possessing certain demographic characteristics



















ic;m)dt = Rfc (3.2)
where F t
c(Di;m) is a national distribution of people who possess characteristic c at time t. Each
person is characterized by the demographic characteristics Di and the market m they belong to.
13For each time t and demographic characteristic c, I draw I observation pairs (Dt
ic;m) from
the nationally aggregated CPS. Let g = (g1;g2) represent the empirical moments and W be a
























dF(i)   Rfc = g1 8c
1
size of 
Z1(   L) = g2
(3.3)
where L is a lag operator that converts the vector  into one-period lagged values. If the radio
station did not exist in the previous period, the lag operator has a value of zero. Integration with
respect to demographics when calculating the rst constraint is obtained by drawing from the
CPS in the particular market and period. This way of integrating allows us to maintain proper
correlations between possessed demographic characteristics. The same is true when obtaining the
data set Dict. When computing the interaction terms  in the second constraint, I draw one vector
i from the normal distribution for each Dict.
3.2 Second stage
The second stage of the estimation obtains the competition matrix 
 and the parameters of
demand for advertising A. The estimation is done separately for every market, thereby allowing
for dierent 
 and A.
To compute the matrices 
m for each market I use the specication layed out in section 1.3.
The elements of the matrix 












following equation (1.6). The rfja are advertisers' beliefs about listeners' preferences for formats.
These are constant across markets. To recognize that advertisers know the demographic composi-
tion of each market I allow for market specic listener arrival rates for each format rm
fja. However,
14I assume that the advertisers compute those values by using Radio Today reports and the Cur-
rent Population Survey. After computing weights, I treat 
m as exogenous and xed in all of the
following steps 3.
After computing matrices 
, I estimate A. Using estimates of demand for radio programming
L from the rst stage, I compute ratings for each station conditioned on the counterfactual




C] = 0 8m 2 M (3.4)
where the integral is taken with respect to time and stations in each market. tm
j is an unobserved
shock to marginal cost dened in equation (1.5). The Z2 are three instruments: a column of ones,
the AM/FM dummy and number of competitors in the same format. They are uncorrelated with
m under the IID assumption, but are correlated with the current choice of quantity because they
describe the market structure.
We back out tm



































Since the equation does not depend on A
1m, I can use it to estimate A
2m and C
m. During the
estimation, I allow for a dierent value of marginal cost for each market. I allow for 3 dierent
values for the slope of inverse demand depending on the population of the market (up to 500 people,
between 500 and 1500, and 1500 or more). Ratings and derivatives of ratings in the equation (3.5)
are calculated using the estimates of L and  from the rst stage. Demographic draws are taken
from the CPS and are independent of those used in the rst stage. Given the estimates of A
2m and
C, I can back out A
1m by equating the observed average revenue in each market with its predicted
counterpart.
Next I discuss a variation in the data that identies parameters A and C. The intuition for
such identication is that estimating Equation 3.5 can be regarded as a linear regression in which
C
m is an intercept and A
2 is a coecient of a variable that is a function of supplied quantity. In this
case, the mean deviation of FOCs from zero in each market identies the intercept C
m. The slope
3Such an approach potentially ignores possible variance of the 
m estimator. The source of this variance might
come from the niteness of the CPS dataset and the distribution of Arbitron estimates.
15parameter A
2 is identied by the size of the response of the rm to changes in quantity supplied
by its competitors due to change in the market structure or demographics. Such a response,
as mentioned in Section 1, is composed of listeners' demand feedback and the direct eect of
quantity on CPP. Elasticity of listeners' demand, that determines the strength of the feedback, is
consistently estimated in the rst step. Therefore, one can subtract the dierence out the feedback
eect from the total response observed in the data. This allows to obtain the strength of the direct
eect that directly identies the slope of the CPP, A
2 . For example, if we look at the response of
ad quantity reacting to the merger, the slope of listeners' demand alone predicts large increases in
ad quantity. However in the data, we observe smaller increases or even decrease in the quantity




This section presents estimates of the structural parameters. The next subsection discusses listen-
ers' demand parameters. This is followed by results concerning advertisers' demand and marker
power. The last subsection contains estimates of marginal cost and prot margin (before subtract-
ing xed cost).
4.1 Listeners' demand
Table 3 contains estimates of demand parameters for radio programming. The estimate of the
mean eect of advertising on listeners' utility is negative and statistically signicant. This is
consistent with the belief that radio listeners have a disutility for advertising. When it comes to
the mean eects of programming formats, Contemporary Hit Radio format gives the most utility,
while the News/Talk format gives the least.
The second column of Table 3 contains variances of random eects for station formats. The
higher a format's variance, the more persistent are the tastes of listeners for that format. For
example, in response to an increased amount of advertising, if the variance of the random eect
for that format is high, listeners tend to switch to a station of the same format. The estimates
also suggest that tastes for the Alternative/Urban format are the most persistent.
16Table 4 contains estimates of interactions between listener characteristics and format dummies.
The majority of the parameters are consistent with intuition. For example, younger people are more
willing to choose a CHR format while older people go for News/Talk. The negative coecients on
the interaction of Hispanic format with education and income suggests that less educated Hispanic
people with lower income are more willing to listen to Hispanic stations. For blacks, I nd a
disutility for Country, Rock and Hispanic, and a high utility for Urban. This is consistent with
the the fact that Urban radio stations play mostly rap, hip-hop and soul music performed by black
artists.
4.2 Advertisers' demand
Tables 5 presents the weights for selected markets representing large, medium and small listener
populations. They were computed using the 1999 edition of Radio Today publication and Common
Population Survey aggregated from 1996 to 2006. It is interesting to compute a total impact
coecient that is the sum of all the columns of the table for each format. Not surprisingly, general
interest formats like AC and News/Talk have the biggest impact on the price of advertising,
while Spanish format has the smallest. The values on the diagonals of the matrices represent
the formats' own eect of the quantity of advertising supplied on per-listener price. They are
usually bigger than the o-diagonal values, that suggests that it is mostly the ad quantity in the
same format that inuences a per-listener price. In accord with an intuition, the formats with
the most demographically homogenous listener pools, Urban/Alternative and Spanish, have the
highest values of the own eects. On the other hand, general interest formats like CHR and Rock
are charaterized by the smallest values of the own eect, measuring the fact that their target
population of listeners is more dispersed across other formats. For cross eects, one notices that
News/Talk is close to AC and Urban is close to CHR. This can be explained by, for example, the
age of the listeners. In the former case the formats appeal to an older population while in the
latter case to a younger one.
Estimates of the slope of inverse demand are presented in Table 6. In markets with less than
0.5m people radio stations have considerable control over the per-listener price. However, such
control signicantly drops in markets from 0.5m to 2m people, and it disappears completely in
markets with more than 2m people, making radio stations essentially price takers. I suspect that
17this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that in larger markets there are more outside options
for radio advertising. This can lead to tougher competition between media outlets, and make the
inverse demand for advertising atter. However, in small markets radio might be a primary
advertising channel, because other media like the Internet or billboards are not as widespread.
This gives radio stations more control over price.
4.3 Supply
The marginal costs of selling advertising minutes are presented in Table 7. The values of this cost
range from $356 per minute of advertising sold in Los Angeles, CA to $11 in Ft. Myers, FL. 66%
of the variation in marginal cost can be explained by variation in market population. A population
increase of one thousand translates to about a 2 cent increase in marginal cost (with t-stat equal
to 12). The high correlation between population and marginal costs can be explained by the fact
that revenues per-minute of advertising are an increasing function of total market population.
Suppose this surplus is split between radio station owners and advertisers' sales people according
to the Nash Bargaining solution. In this case, the high correlation of revenue with population will
translate into a high correlation of marginal cost with population.
From the revenues and marginal cost estimates, I can calculate variable prot margins. These
are presented in the last last column of Table 7. The range is from 92% in Shreveport, LA to 15%
in Honolulu, HI and Reno, NV. It is interesting that 38% of the prot margin variation can be
explained by the variance in total ad quantity supplied and markets with high prot margins rms
supply more advertising. The marginal eect of extra minute per day of broadcasted advertising
translates into 0.6% of extra prot margin.
5 Counterfactual experiments
In this section I investigate the impact of consolidation on listener and advertiser welfare. First,
I investigate the changes in the surplus of listeners and advertisers. In particular, I calculate how
much market power was exercised on both of those groups. Second, I decompose market power into
a variety component and extra market power that is manifested in changes in quantity supplied.
Before performing counterfactual calculations, consider descriptive relationships between con-
18centration and prices. First, I regressed market Price Per Rating Point on a market's HHI, including
market xed eects. I nd that higher concentration is correlated with higher prices in the adver-
tising market, suggesting that radio station owners are exercising some amount of market power
on advertisers. Second, I regressed total advertising supplied on the market's HHI with market
dummies. Here I get a coecient of 1:65(0:3). This is evidence of market power in the listener
market. Because market power appears to be present in both market segments, I cannot denitely
conclude who had more surplus extracted by radio station owners if I just use quantities and prices.
In the next subsection I present the structural counterfactuals that answer this question.
5.1 Impact of mergers on consumer surplus
To isolate the impact of the Telecom Act on a surplus division between advertisers and listeners, I
perform a counterfactual in which I recompute new equilibrium ad quantities under the old 1996
ownership structure and 1996 formats. This calculation is motivated by the fact that in 1996 many
markets were at their ownership caps.
The total impact of consolidation on advertiser and listener welfare is presented in the last row
of Table 8. It turns out that mergers decrased total ad quantity by roughtly 14 thousand minutes.
That resulted in lowering average ad exposure by 4.8 persons-day-minutes (pdm), which is about
10% of the total ad load. The changes translated to about a 4.7 pdm increase in consumer welfare.
Because we do not observe dollar prices in the listenership market we cannot compute the dollar
value of this compensating variation. However, we can compute a rough estimate using the prices
for the satellite radio. If we assume people buy satelite radio just to avoid advertising, we get a
rough estimate of 1.5 cents per minute, or 730million dollars for each person-day-minute per year.
The total eect would amount to $3.5b. This is of course a very loose upper bound on the overall
welfare gain, however if make a conservative assumption that only 10% of the value of satellite
radio is lack of advertising, we get $350m.
For advertisers, a decrease in quantity supplied leads to about 2:57% increase in per-listener
prices, or a $300m decrease in advertiser surplus. I therefore conclude that the Telecom Act lead
to a reallocation of surplus from advertisers to listenerss. Moreover, because the gain by listeners
($350m) is larger than the surplus lost by advertisers, I nd that the Act created new surplus.
This increase can be explained by the fact that listeners are more annoyed by ads than the value
19of an ad to the advertisers.
A deeper story can be told by looking seperately at small versus large markets. As mentioned
in the previous section, radio stations have considerable control over prices in small markets, and
no control in the large markets. Motivated by this fact, I present counterfactuals for markets
with less than 0.5 population and more than 2m population. In smaller markets (see Table 9),
stations contract advertising to exercise market power on advertisers. They supply more than
10,000 minutes less of advertising. That translates into a 7.3pdm decrease in ad exposure, which
increases consumer surplus by 11.6pdm. However, prices rise by 6:4%, and cause a $230m loss
in advertiser surplus. On the other hand in large markets (see Table 10) rms supply more than
2,000 extra minutes of advertising, which lowers consumer surplus by almost 2pdm. On balance,
this does not aect advertiser surplus. I conclude that listeners gained form the Telecom Act only
in small markets.
5.2 Eects of product variety and market power
Berry and Waldfogel (2001) suggest that the negative eects of ownership consolidation on listeners
might be mitigated by format switching. They nd that post-merger repositioning results in spatial
competition leading to more variety, which they assume is benecial for the listeners 4. To quantify
this eect, I compare surpluses computed imposing 1996 ownership and formats with surpluses
computed imposing actual ownership and formats without ad quantity adjustments. That is, I
x ad quantities computed with 1996 ownership and formats. The results of this experiment are
presented in the rst row of Table 8. It turns out that if I do not account for quantity changes,
the assertion of Berry and Waldfogel (2001) is true. In this case, listeners have a 1.3% larger
surplus (about 6.6pdm) after consolidation and format switching. Listener surplus grows because
of two factors: increased variety and decreased advertising exposure. The latter decreased even
though I keep number of ad minutes xed. However, in the real world, repositioning changes rms'
incentives to set ad quantity, because it softens competition in the advertising market. The impact
of quantity readjustments is presented in the middle row of Table 8. It turns out that both listeners
and advertisers are worse o due to quantity adjustments. Listeners lose 1.9pdm and advetisers
lose additional $150m in surplus.
4Similar results obtained using direct analysis of station playlists can be found in Sweeting (2008).
206 Robustness analysis
This section examines the robustness of my advertising model to dierent assumptions about
competition among station formats. This step is motivated by the fact that the data concerning
advertiser deals is incomplete. I deal with the incompleteness by proposing a stilyzed decision
model for advertisers that uses publicly available data to predict substitution patterns between
formats. These patterns directly detemine the market power of stations over advertsers, and can
potentially alter the results of counterfactual experiments.
To investigate the robustness of the results, I reestimated the model under two alternative
assumptions. The rst scenario represents the extreme situation in which formats compete only
between themselves. In particular, suppose that advertiser types get utility from only one particular
format. In this case, equation (1.6) has !ff = 1 and !ff0 = 0 if f 6= f0. The second scenario
represents another extreme in which formats are perfect substitutes, i.e., there is only one type of
advertiser who values all formats in the same way. Formally this means that !ff0 = 1=8, because
there are 8 possible formats. The estimated model is in a sense in-between the these extreme
alternatives, because it assumes that formats are imperfect substitutes.
Estimates of the inverse demand advertising slopes are presented in Table 11. The estimates
show that the baseline model lies between the two extremes. When we assume oligopoly within a
format, the estimated slope parameter L
2 is smaller than the one in the baseline model. On the
other hand in the perfect substitutes model, the estimated slope tends to be higher. Despite the fact
that there are statistical dierences between the dierent models, the main qualitative assertion,
that stations have more power in smaller markets, still holds. In order to assess the economic
implication of those dierences, I recomputed the estimated prot margin under dierent models.
It turns out that the model with format oligopoly predicts on average a 2.4% higher prot margins
than the baseline model. Conversely the model with perfect substitutes predicts 2.1% lower prot
margin.
To draw nal conclusions about the strength of the assumption about weights, I recomputed
the main counterfactual using the alternative models. The results are presented in Table 12.
The baseline again lies between the new counterfactuals. There is no qualitative change in the
results. Moreover the percentage changes in consumer and advertiser surplus are almost the same.
21Consequently, I conclude that the results of the paper are not sensitive to changes in the assumption
about substitution between formats.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze mergers in two-sided markets on the example of the 1996-2006 consolidation
wave in U.S. radio industry. The goal of this study is to describe and quantify how mergers in
the two-sided market dier from a dierentiated product oligopoly setting. I make two main
contributions. First, I recognize the fact two-sided markets consist of two types of consumers,
who may be aected by the merger in dierent ways. For example, if extra market power causes
the radio station to increase advertising, it will benet consumers but hurt advertisers. Second, I
disaggregate the impact of a merger on consumers into changes in the variety of available products
and changes in supplied quantity of ads.
Radio is an important medium in the U.S., reaching about 94% of Americans twelve years old
or older each week. Moreover, the average consumer listens to about 20h of radio per week and
between 6am and 6pm more people use radio than TV or print media5. In 1996 the Telecommu-
nication Act deregulated the industry by raising local ownership caps. This deregulation caused a
massive merger wave, that reshaped the ownership structure, by moving from family based owner-
ship into more corporate structures. I estimate that this consolidation raised consumer surplus by
1%, but lowered advertiser surplus by $300m. I nd that the mergers created extra variety that
increased listener welfare by $1.3%. On the other hand they softened competition and decreased
advertiser welfare by $147m per year. Subsequent ad quantity adjustments led to a 0.3% decrease
in listener welfare (with the variety eect it totals to the 1% increase) and an additional $153m
decrease in advertiser welfare (with the variety eect it totals $300m).
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Table 1: Simple example of advertising weights
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of
stations
26.75 26.92 27.25 27.53 27.66 27.89 28.48 28.61 28.72 28.78 28.86
Number of
owners
16.58 15.55 14.94 14.21 13.29 13.03 13.16 12.96 12.73 12.52 12.48
C3 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.90
Number of
stations owned








0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 NaN
Ad quantity 23.19 25.85 26.12 28.45 30.31 24.71 28.37 24.54 28.16 28.30 26.95
Price divided by
price in 1996
1.00 0.96 1.08 1.10 1.26 1.51 1.42 1.51 1.39 1.37 1.43
Table 2: Panel data descriptive statistics
25Mean Eects (L




















































Table 3: Estimates of mean and random eects of demand for radio programming. Stars indicate
parameter signicance when testing with 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 test sizes.
26Demographics characteristics ()





















































































































0.22 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.00 0.17
Rock 0.15 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.12
CHR 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.13
Alternative
Urban
0.11 0.05 0.17 0.44 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.12
News/Talk 0.17 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.30 0.13 0.00 0.21
Country 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.01 0.21
Spanish 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.72 0.04
Other 0.18 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.23












0.20 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.18
Rock 0.14 0.21 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.01 0.13
CHR 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.13
Alternative
Urban
0.11 0.06 0.16 0.40 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.13
News/Talk 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.22
Country 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.26 0.01 0.22
Spanish 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.71 0.03
Other 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.23 0.01 0.25












0.20 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.16
Rock 0.13 0.21 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.01 0.12
CHR 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.13
Alternative
Urban
0.12 0.06 0.16 0.38 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.13
News/Talk 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.01 0.18
Country 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.22 0.01 0.16
Spanish 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.66 0.05
Other 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.01 0.21
Total impact 1.12 0.90 1.11 1.05 0.74 1.21 0.72 1.14
Table 5: Product closeness matrices for chosen markets
28Market population less than .5m between .5m and 1.5m more than 1.5m
1.34 (0.046) 0.35 (0.026) 0.00 (0.008)
Table 6: Slope of the inverse demand for ads A











Los Angeles, CA 13,155 356.4 (5.15) 30% Tulsa, OK 856 72.8 (2.13) 21%
Chicago, IL 9,341 180.0 (2.70) 34% Knoxville, TN 785 54.3 (1.99) 27%
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX 5,847 198.6 (5.60) 28% Albuquerque, NM 740 27.4 (1.04) 36%
Houston-Galveston, TX 5,279 199.7 (4.20) 28% Ft. Myers-Naples-Marco Island, FL 737 11.3 (0.94) 57%
Atlanta, GA 4,710 95.4 (3.37) 43% Omaha-Council Blus, NE-IA 728 48.0 (0.91) 28%
Boston, MA 4,532 172.2 (3.68) 33% Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 649 29.7 (1.44) 42%
Miami-Ft, FL 4,174 134.3 (3.70) 28% El Paso, TX 619 41.8 (4.12) 20%
Seattle-Tacoma, WA 3,776 128.7 (2.21) 29% Quad Cities, IA-IL 618 51.3 (1.30) 23%
Phoenix, AZ 3,638 63.7 (1.84) 39% Wichita, KS 598 38.9 (0.85) 25%
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN 3,155 160.8 (4.66) 26% Little Rock, AR 577 45.2 (1.64) 26%
St. Louis, MO 2,689 190.6 (5.38) 18% Columbia, SC 577 60.0 (2.10) 23%
Tampa-St, FL 2,649 102.7 (2.09) 26% Charleston, SC 569 59.6 (1.74) 19%
Denver-Boulder, CO 2,604 99.9 (1.40) 32% Des Moines, IA 564 21.3 (0.92) 40%
Portland, OR 2,352 48.6 (1.35) 41% Spokane, WA 540 24.5 (0.63) 28%
Cleveland, OH 2,134 170.6 (3.34) 24% Madison, WI 520 93.6 (3.02) 22%
Charlotte, NC-SC 2,127 67.1 (1.96) 38% Augusta, GA 510 30.9 (0.60) 24%
Sacramento, CA 2,100 47.6 (1.30) 42% Ft. Wayne, IN 509 37.8 (1.35) 27%
Salt Lake City, UT 1,924 58.1 (1.19) 26% Lexington-Fayette, KY 495 36.8 (1.59) 35%
San Antonio, TX 1,900 75.0 (2.27) 24% Chattanooga, TN 471 41.5 (2.53) 29%
Kansas City, MO-KS 1,871 152.5 (2.87) 19% Boise, ID 469 46.2 (3.73) 30%
Las Vegas, NV 1,752 47.7 (1.49) 32% Jackson, MS 453 18.6 (2.03) 59%
Milwaukee-Racine, WI 1,713 74.6 (1.27) 25% Eugene-Springeld, OR 439 27.4 (1.29) 31%
Orlando, FL 1,686 42.4 (1.77) 41% Reno, NV 400 99.7 (1.64) 15%
Columbus, OH 1,685 70.2 (1.53) 30% Shreveport, LA 359 19.8 (4.25) 92%
Indianapolis, IN 1,602 86.8 (2.32) 26% Fayetteville, NC 337 38.1 (2.48) 46%
Norfolk, VA 1,583 196.8 (4.64) 17% Springeld, MA 336 20.8 (0.87) 55%
Nashville, TN 1,342 40.5 (1.84) 38% Macon, GA 276 34.4 (2.29) 26%
Greensboro-Winston, NC 1,329 53.5 (2.34) 32% Binghamton, NY 255 37.5 (1.51) 27%
New Orleans, LA 1,294 91.2 (2.44) 24% Lubbock, TX 248 57.7 (1.98) 18%
Memphis, TN 1,278 53.2 (1.82) 30% Odessa-Midland, TX 231 21.4 (0.99) 27%
Jacksonville, FL 1,271 66.1 (1.64) 29% Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 200 48.6 (2.42) 25%
Oklahoma City, OK 1,268 75.6 (1.35) 25% Medford-Ashland, OR 184 27.7 (0.90) 28%
Bualo-Niagara Falls, NY 1,150 141.5 (3.63) 19% Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 159 43.3 (0.79) 20%
Louisville, KY 1,100 92.9 (2.36) 21% Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 157 31.7 (1.41) 21%
Richmond, VA 1,066 55.3 (1.47) 28% Abilene, TX 149 23.0 (1.14) 26%
Birmingham, AL 1,030 85.8 (2.50) 24% Eau Claire, WI 149 31.6 (2.77) 28%
Honolulu, HI 938 78.2 (2.39) 15% Williamsport, PA 130 31.0 (1.13) 23%
Albany, NY 909 113.9 (3.18) 16% Monroe, LA 124 14.2 (1.49) 64%
Grand Junction, CO 902 24.5 (0.67) 24% Sioux City, IA 118 26.1 (0.96) 24%
Tucson, AZ 870 41.1 (0.93) 27% San Angelo, TX 104 26.4 (1.36) 16%
Grand Rapids, MI 864 37.9 (0.79) 38% Bismarck, ND 99 32.8 (1.65) 22%
Table 7: Estimated marginal cost (in dollars per minute of broadcasted advertising) and prot margins (before subtracting the xed









































Table 9: Counterfactuals for small markets (less than 500k people)
Market population less than .5m between .5m and 1.5m more than 1.5m
Baseline model 1.34 (0.046) 0.35 (0.026) 0.00 (0.008)
Oligopoly within format 1.07 (0.036) 0.28 (0.061) 0.02 (0.009)
Perfect substitutes 1.44 (0.035) 0.32 (0.030) 0.01 (0.009)
Table 11: Slope of the inverse demand for ads A























































































































Table 12: Robustness of counterfactuals
B Advertising demand: Micro foundations
In this section I present a model that rationalizes inverse demand for advertising (1.5)
Assume that there are A types of advertisers. Each type a 2 A targets a certain demographic group(s) da. Let 2 be a total mass
of advertisers and ASa be a share of advertisers of type a in market m. Advertisers are also heterogeneous in their value of the ad slot
in format f, and I assume that those values are distributed uniformly on the interval [0;1f]. An advertiser of type a gets utility only if
a listener of type da hears an ad. To compute the exact expected value of an advertising slot, advertisers need to know the demographic
composition of each station in the market. Because advertisers are small, and such detailed data is not oered by Arbitron, it seems
unlikely that they would be able to do that. Instead, I assume that they approximate those calculations using publicly available data
contained in Arbitron's Radio Today publications. These publications provide nation-wide conditional probabilities rfja of a consumer
of type da choosing format f conditional on listening to the radio. Advertisers take these conditional probabilities as given and compute







c rfjaLSa and LSa is the population share of demographic group da, which is assumed to be known to the advertiser.
Having listeners' distributions rajf and station ratings rj (available on Arbitron's website) at hand, advertisers compute the probability
of successful targeting at station j to be rjrajf, where f is a format of station j.
Radio stations quote costs-per-point CPPaf individually for each advertiser type and format. Advertisers decide if they want to
purchase advertising after observing the CPPs and station ratings. Because advertisers are small and likely do not have much market
power over radio station owners, I assume that they are price and rating takers6. Advertisers can purchase advertising from several
stations at once; however, I assume away any potential complementarities.
In equilibrium, advertisers purchase advertising as long as their expected value is above price. Let qa be the amount of advertising
purchased by advertisers of type a. A marginal advertiser must be indierent between purchasing advertising or not, so the clearing








Given the clearing prices CPPaf, advertisers are indierent when choosing between formats, so I assume that advertising is purchased
proportionally to the target listeners' tastes i.e. qa = ASa
P
f rfjaqf. If I make the simplifying assumption that ASa  LSa, then the
arrival probability of an advertiser of type a at a station of format f would be equal to rajf. Therefore, expected per-listener price in
6This assumption is is motivated by the fact that about 75% is purchased by small local rms. Such rms'
advertising decisions are unlikely to inuence prices and station ratings in the short run.




















































2 and assuming that 1 = 1f
P
a(rajf)2 for all f. The last assumption
basically means that niche formats (with listenership concentrated in one demographic bin) are less protable for advertisers than
general interest formats.
The presented model is only one of a number of ways to rationalize the weighted price equation (1.5) in which competition between
formats is channeled though demographics. Other possibilities include: a local monopoly in which each advertiser type draws utility
only from advertising on one particular station, and a format-monopoly in which each advertiser type targets only one format.
C Numerical considerations
To solve the optimization problem (3.3), I used a version of the Gauss-Newton method implemented in the commercial solver KNITRO.
Using this state-of-the-art solver avoids certain convergence problems that are common to many non-linear estimators.
The iteration step of the KNITRO solver requires computing constraints, a Jacobian of the constraint, and an inverse of the inner
product of this Jacobian (used to compute the approximate Hessian of the Lagrangian). The objective function and its Jacobian come
essentially for free because of their simple nature.
To compute the constraints and their Jacobian, I employed a piece of highly optimized parallel C code. This allows the use a fairly
large dataset (about 42,000 observations) and many draws (500 draws from Normal and CPS per date/market) when computing the
constraints. When parallelizing the code, I was careful to maintain independence of the draws within and between threads. To achieve
this, I implemented a version of a pseudo-random number generator (described in (L'Ecuyer and Andres 1997)). This generator enables
us to create a desired number of independent pseudo-random feeds for each thread.
One iteration of the solver takes about two to three minutes on an 8-Core 3Ghz Intel Xeon processor and uses about 4GB of
memory. About 90% of this computation is the inversion of a Hessian estimator within the KNITRO solver. This inversion cannot be
parallelized because it is done inside the solver, without the user's control.
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